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We develop a simple model that links the adoption of a productivity-enhancing technology to increased vertical inte-gration and a less skilled workforce. We test the model’s key prediction using novel microdata on vehicle ownership
patterns from the Economic Census during a period when computerized dispatching systems were first adopted by taxicab
firms. Controlling for time-invariant firm-specific effects, firms increase the proportion of taxicabs under fleet ownership
by 12% when they adopt new computerized dispatching systems. An instrumental variables analysis suggests that the
link between dispatching technology and vertical integration is causal. These findings suggest that increasing a firm’s
productivity can lead to increased vertical integration, even in the absence of asset specificity.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines how technology adoption influ-
ences firm boundaries and worker skills. Since Coase’s
(1937) famous observation that firms coordinate trans-
actions internally when doing so is more efficient than
coordinating those activities through markets, scholars
have sought to explain how firms’ boundaries are deter-
mined. A large body of empirical evidence now sup-
ports the core predictions of transaction cost economics
(TCE) (Williamson 1975, 1985) and property rights the-
ory (PRT) (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore
1990)—namely, that asset specificity and contractual
incompleteness are key determinants of the boundaries
of the firm. However, an alternative theory of the firm,
initiated by Demsetz (1988), proposes that changes in
the productivity of potential trading partners can also
influence firm boundaries. This productivity-based the-
ory of integration has received far less empirical support
(Jacobides and Hitt 2005), perhaps because the under-
lying logic has remained informal and imprecise. This
paper provides a formal productivity-based theory of
asset ownership and tests it by measuring the impact of
information technology adoption on asset ownership in
the taxicab industry.
In our theoretical model, a firm consists of an asset
or a collection of assets (e.g., taxicabs), matched to
employees of varying skill, using a particular technol-
ogy. There are two ways to produce: one relies on
skilled labor and little formal control, and the other uses
information technology (IT) to coordinate production.
Each firm seeks opportunities to produce output using
its assets, and our measure of productivity is the prob-
ability that the assets are actually utilized. In equilib-
rium, the model predicts three types of organization:
(i) highly skilled autonomous employee-owners, (ii) less
skilled employee-owners who contract with a third-party
information technology provider, and (iii) firms that uti-
lize unskilled labor and in-house information technol-
ogy. The choice among these three modes of organiza-
tion does not reflect asset specificity or noncontractible
ex ante investments. Rather, technological capabilities
and heterogeneous labor productivity drive both joint
production and vertical integration decisions.
We use the model to analyze forward vertical inte-
gration by a supplier whose technology improves.
When assets are capacity constrained, as in Levinthal
and Wu (2010), concurrent production opportunities
are redundant, and the marginal benefits of technol-
ogy improvements are declining in labor productivity.
This observation leads directly to our main prediction:
improvements in technology lead to increased integra-
tion and a greater reliance on unskilled labor. Intuitively,
the technology owner captures more surplus by acquir-
ing assets and using low-skilled workers to produce the
final good than by selling an input to skilled third parties
who value it less.
In our empirical application, firms are taxicab fleets,
employees are drivers, and the capacity-constrained
assets are taxicabs seeking rides. The three types of orga-
nization in our theoretical model correspond to (i) inde-
pendent owner-operators, (ii) fleet-affiliated drivers who
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drivers who rent both a car and dispatching service from
a fleet. Our theory predicts that improvements in com-
puterized dispatching technology will lead to increased
vertical integration as fleets acquire vehicles from fleet-
affiliated drivers who previously used the fleet’s dis-
patching system as a source of referrals. To test these
predictions, we use detailed microdata on taxicab firms’
vehicle ownership patterns from the Economic Census
during a period (1992–1997) when new computerized
dispatching systems that greatly improved dispatch times
and fleet utilization levels were first widely adopted.1
The taxicab industry is an attractive setting in which
to measure the impact of productivity on asset owner-
ship for several reasons. First, production and organiza-
tional technologies in this industry are relatively simple,
which helps us isolate the impact of a technology-
induced productivity change from potential confound-
ing factors, including changes in asset specificity, incen-
tive intensity, and monitoring. Second, the returns to
adopting new dispatching technology are decreasing in
driver ability, which satisfies a key assumption of our
theoretical model. High-ability taxicab drivers possess
unique knowledge about the spatial and temporal vari-
ation in demand within a city,2 which allows them to
be more productive than low-ability drivers.3 Because a
skilled driver’s local knowledge reduces his reliance on
dispatching, he finds improvements in dispatching tech-
nology less valuable. Finally, local taxicab markets are
distinct and heterogeneous, allowing us to exploit exoge-
nous variation in local market conditions as part of our
empirical strategy. In particular, we use population den-
sity and the characteristics of other fleets in the same
geographic market as instrumental variables (IVs) that
are correlated with the costs and benefits of computer-
ized dispatch systems but are uncorrelated with a focal
fleet’s asset ownership decisions.
Our empirical results show that adopting a computer-
ized dispatching system causes taxicab firms to increase
the percentage of vehicles they own, compared to those
they contract for in the open market. Specifically, in a
first-differences specification that accounts for time-
invariant firm heterogeneity, we find that when firms
adopt computerized dispatching systems, they increase
the proportion of fleet-owned taxicabs by 12% relative to
nonadopters. This result is robust to increasingly strin-
gent controls for endogenous technology adoption and
suggests that, by reducing the returns to skilled labor,
computerized dispatching technology leads to increased
vertical integration in taxicab fleets.
The present study fits into the strategy literature
on firm boundaries and also the economics literature
on skill-biased technical change. For the literature on
firm boundaries, this paper has two main contributions.
First, we develop a model that predicts a systematic
relationship between productivity-enhancing technology
and the vertical boundary of the firm. Though simple,
this model is a first step toward formalizing the intu-
itive relationship between productivity and firm bound-
aries discussed by Demsetz (1988) and in the literature
on capabilities (Jacobides and Winter 2005).4 Second,
we provide empirical evidence that technology adoption
causes firms to increasingly vertically integrate, even
without changes in asset specificity.
For the literature on skill-biased technological change,
we contribute to the emerging view that information
technology adoption does not always increase the rel-
ative demand for more skilled labor. Our finding
that communication technology complements central-
ized organization and low worker skill is consistent
with recent work by Bloom et al. (2009) and Mahr
and Kretschmer (2010). Whereas those papers focus on
endogenous skill formation and the span of managerial
control, we take skills to be exogenous and emphasize
changes in the boundary of the firm. However, all three
papers suggest limitations to the standard skill-biased
technical change hypothesis that information technology
typically increases the demand for skilled labor (e.g.,
Bresnahan et al. 2002, Card and DiNardo 2006).
2. Productivity and Firm Boundaries
The literature on firm boundaries contains several the-
ories of vertical integration, each offering a different
explanation for why firms choose to own a particu-
lar set of assets along their production value chain.
TCE suggests that integration reduces the inevitable cost
of haggling over the division of surplus when trad-
ing partners are locked into a relationship (Williamson
1975, 1985). PRT suggests that ownership provides
incentives to make efficient but noncontractible invest-
ments (Grossman and Hart 1986). In both TCE and
PRT, firms own assets and transact internally when
asset specificity—the reduction in the value of an asset
between its best and second-best use—is high and mar-
ket contracts are fraught with hazards.5
We develop and test a formal model based on a third
branch of the theory of the firm, which proposes that
vertical integration will obtain when firms are more
efficient at performing key routines or activities com-
pared to their potential trading partners (Demsetz 1988,
Langlois 1992, Jacobides and Winter 2005). Specif-
ically, the model describes conditions under which
productivity-enhancing information technology adoption
induces firms to purchase assets and use unskilled labor
to operate them. The key assumption in our model
is that capacity constraints can reduce the total value
created by productivity improvements on one side of
an arm’s-length transaction. Thus, to capture the rents
produced by improved productivity, a firm must either
find unconstrained trading partners (who benefit from
the new technology) or integrate to produce a captive
source of unconstrained trading opportunities. For exam-
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taxicabs utilized with little assistance from a dispatcher
do not benefit from improvements in dispatching tech-
nology. And as our theory suggests, taxicab fleets that
adopt automated dispatching systems also vertically inte-
grate by acquiring cars and leasing them to unskilled
drivers who rely on the dispatcher for rides.6 The capac-
ity constraints in our model are closely related to the
idea of capacity-constrained capabilities in the study by
Levinthal and Wu (2010), who invoked the concept to
study diversification.7 We use the same idea to study the
joint determination of asset ownership and labor skill.
2.1. A Model of Productivity, Asset Ownership,
and Integration
Suppose there are three types of agents: providers of
skilled labor, providers of unskilled labor, and a firm
that supplies a technology.8 Production requires match-
ing one unit of labor, skilled or unskilled, to an asset
(e.g., a taxicab). Assets may be owned by any type of
agent and can produce up to one unit of value per period
(i.e., one unit of an output whose price is normalized
to one). There is a total supply of one unit of assets
to be allocated among all agents, including the firm.9
Production is Leontief with respect to capital and labor,
meaning that assets and workers are supplied in fixed
proportions—one worker for each asset. Thus, technol-
ogy adoption cannot lead to substitution of capital for
labor, though it may alter the mix of skills and relative
productivity of employees in the industry.10
Given an asset, skilled workers can produce  > 0
units of output per period with no assistance from the
firm. Worker ability () is private information drawn
from a uniform distribution on the unit interval.11
A skilled worker’s reservation wage is w > 0. There is
an inexhaustible supply of unskilled workers, for whom
 = 0 and w = 0.
Skilled workers can purchase an asset or rent one
from the firm. Moreover, skilled workers who own an
asset could work independently or contract with the
firm. Thus, our model allows four possible modes of
organization (though only three will occur in equilib-
rium): firm asset ownership (vertical integration) with
either skilled or unskilled workers, skilled worker asset
ownership with contracting with the firm, or skilled
worker asset ownership without contracting with the
firm. In the taxicab industry, these organizational forms
correspond to fleet ownership of vehicles with either
high- or low-skill drivers, skilled drivers contracting with
a fleet for dispatching services, and skilled drivers work-
ing independently.
The firm’s job is to coordinate the production process.
Specifically, access to the firm’s technology (dispatch-
ing system) increases the productivity of unskilled labor
to  units of output per period. Skilled labor can also
use the firm’s technology to augment their productiv-
ity. Specifically, skilled workers generate  + 41 − 5
units of output by working with the firm. This func-
tion can be derived by assuming that in each period
the firm locates opportunities with probability , and
the skilled worker locates opportunities with probabil-
ity , which is independent of , and because of capac-
ity constraints, no more than one opportunity may be
served concurrently.12 Given this technology, a skilled
worker’s gross benefit from contracting with the firm
(i.e., the gain over independent production before any
payments to the firm) equals (1 − 5, which declines
with skill. Finally, we assume that the firm’s technolog-
ical resources are scale-free, in the sense that the per-
worker benefits of joint production depend on  but not
the number of agents working with the firm.
The model has two periods. Assets are allocated in the
first stage according to the following process: (i) the firm
offers a (passive) central planner a price b for its assets,
(ii) workers who wish to purchase an asset for b are
allocated one, and (iii) the firm is allocated the remain-
ing assets at price b. This first stage captures the idea
that assets are allocated via a market (in which the firm
can set prices) prior to any contracting and production.
In the second period, the firm sets one price, p, for con-
tracts with asset owners and a second price, x, for con-
tracts with nonowners, and skilled asset owners decide
whether to remain independent, contract with the firm,
or exit and take their reservation wage.13
We use backwards induction to solve for subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria. To begin, suppose the firm sets
prices p and x. A skilled worker who owns an asset will
choose to contract with the firm if and only if
+ 41 − 5−p >max81w90
This expression says that collaborating with the firm at
price p leaves a skilled worker better off than his next-
best option, which is either operating independently or
exiting. It also implies that skilled asset owners sort by
ability: the most capable workers remain independent,
because for them the marginal benefits of accessing the
firm’s technology are smaller.14 Lower-ability workers
contract with the firm, because their assets would oth-
erwise go unutilized more often. This closely mirrors
outcomes in our empirical setting, where the highest-
ability drivers own their own taxicab but do not contract
with a firm for access to their dispatching technology.
Less skilled drivers may still own their cab but choose
to contract with a fleet to source more rides. The pre-
vious expression also implies that the type of skilled
worker who is indifferent between contracting and work-
ing independently is U = 4−p5/. Thus, firms face a
downward-sloping demand for referrals to independent
asset-owning workers.15
Now, consider the first stage of the model. If the firm
offers to purchase assets at a price of b, the payoff to a
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The first term in (1), −b, is the payoff from operating
independently; the middle terms,  + 41 − 5− p− b
and  + 41 − 5− x, are the payoffs from contracting
with the fleet as an owner and nonowner, respectively;
and the final term, w, is the skilled worker’s outside
option. Comparing the two middle terms reveals that
skilled workers purchase assets and contract with the
firm if and only if p+b < x. Otherwise, skilled workers
prefer the “bundle” (rental plus dispatch) offered to the
unskilled. In the appendix we prove, as Lemma 1, that in
any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, p+ b < x = .
Skilled workers never rent assets, and the firm charges
the limit price  to unskilled workers.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is that for any x
below , the firm is better off employing unskilled labor
to operate the asset, because x =  is the price that
leaves unskilled workers on their reservation wage of
zero, which is below the skilled workers’ opportunity
cost. In principle, the fleet could set x above  and rent
its assets to skilled workers. If skilled workers anticipate
a high rental price, however, they will opt to acquire
their own assets, which increases the firm’s cost of cap-
ital b and lowers the marginal benefits of increasing
x. Thus, in equilibrium, the firm is better off setting
a low referral price p to capture the residual demand
from skilled owners with underutilized assets and using
unskilled labor to operate any firm-owned assets.16
Because skilled workers correctly anticipate p < −
b, we can ignore the third term in Equation (1) and
derive the firm’s equilibrium level of asset ownership
by comparing the skilled workers’ remaining options:
operating independently, contracting for referrals, and
exiting. Given p and b, the type of skilled worker who is
indifferent between contracting and exit from the indus-
try is L = 4b + p + w − 5/41 − 5. Thus, as long as
L < U , the firm will own a share of assets S4b5= L
and sell referrals to a share of independent asset-owning
workers, D4p1b5 = U − L. When L > U , there is
no demand for contracting, so D4p1b5 = 0, and the
firm’s share of assets is determined by the type of skilled
worker who is indifferent between exiting and operating
independently—specifically, S4b5= b+w. The firm’s ex
ante profits are therefore
ç4p1b5=D4p1b5p+ S4b56− b71
where the first term in ç4p1b5 comes from contract-
ing to provide skilled asset owners with referrals and
the second term is derived from operating firm-owned
assets.17 In the appendix, we solve for the optimal prices
and the resulting allocation of assets. Our main results
are illustrated in Figure 1.
Each point on the horizontal axis of Figure 1 cor-
responds to a different equilibrium, with the allocation
of assets for that equilibrium depicted on the vertical
axis. The figure shows that when  < 41 − w5, for
Figure 1 Firm Productivity, Worker Ability, and Asset
Ownership




















Notes. The equilibrium level of asset ownership in an industry given
worker ability and any given level of firm productivity is illustrated.
For example, at 0, workers with ability between L0 and 
U will
acquire assets and contract with the firm for the right to use their
productive technology. When firm productivity improves, some of
these workers will sell their assets to the firm and exit the industry.
example, at the point 0, the highest-skilled worker pro-
duces more surplus than an unskilled worker operating
the firm’s technology, and the firm sets p∗ = /2 and
b∗ = 4 − w5/2, which leads to U = 1/2 and L =
w/6241 − 57. Thus, the three equilibrium modes
of organization allowed by our model—centralized
production with unskilled labor (vertical integration),
contracting between skilled workers and the firm (joint
production), and independent asset ownership by skilled
workers—will coexist. If skilled and unskilled workers
have the same outside option (w = 0), we have L =
0, and centralized production disappears. Alternatively,
when the firm’s technology outperforms the highest-
skilled worker, so  > 41 − w5, the firm sets b∗ =
4−w5/2 and owns (+w5/2 percent of all assets. In
this case, skilled workers cease to contract with firms,
and there is a sharp transition between firm- and worker-
controlled production.
When < 41−w5, the margin between contracting for
referrals and firm asset ownership is nonlinear; specif-
ically, L is a convex function of , because the firm
faces a trade-off between asset purchases (raising b) and
contracting (raising p) as a mechanism for capturing
the value from their technology. The trade-off between
vertical integration and joint production only emerges
when the benefits of joint production are decreasing in
worker ability (e.g., because of a capacity constraint),
because the firm could otherwise hold D4p1b5 constant
by raising the asset price b and referral price p at exactly
the same rate. Moreover, the trade-off between vertical
integration and joint production disappears when  >
41 −w5, because in that case there is no skilled worker
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This last result can be seen in Figure 1, where the mar-
gin between firm and worker ownership becomes linear
in .
Our main hypothesis summarizes the key comparative
static result of the model by describing how asset own-
ership changes with a shift in the relative productivity
of the firm’s technology, which corresponds to a move
along the horizontal axis in Figure 1.
Hypothesis 1. If a worker’s skill level is private
information and the marginal benefits of technology
adoption are decreasing in worker skill, then an increase
in firm productivity from adopting the new technology
will lead to an increase in vertical integration (asset
ownership).
Intuitively, increasing  raises the price the firm can
charge unskilled labor, which raises the firm’s willing-
ness to pay for assets. Asset purchases drive out the
least capable of the skilled workers. When  is small
enough, it remains efficient to partner with some low-
skilled workers to improve their utilization. However,
the firm contracts less with skilled workers as  grows
because the remaining skilled workers are highly pro-
ductive when working independently, and therefore they
have less excess capacity. Thus, whenever there is joint
production ex ante and the other key conditions of the
model are met, adoption of productivity-enhancing infor-
mation technology unambiguously leads to increased
vertical integration and deskilling within the firm.
Before turning to the details of our empirical set-
ting, we offer a few remarks about the theory. First,
in contrast to TCE and PRT (Williamson 1975, 1985;
Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990), which
assume that a firm’s production technology is fixed and
hypothesize about the correlation between vertical inte-
gration and changes in asset specificity, we assume that
asset specificity in an exchange relationship is fixed (or
at least uncorrelated with changes in production tech-
nology) and hypothesize that there is a positive cor-
relation between productivity and vertical integration.
By separating the effects of productivity from transac-
tion costs, we make a clear prediction about the con-
ditions under which productivity-enhancing information
technology adoption leads to increased firm asset own-
ership. Second, several features of the model are not
stated formally, as hypotheses to be tested, but are nev-
ertheless consistent with the institutional realities of
our empirical setting. In particular, Lemma 1 predicts
that the price of renting assets x will be large com-
pared to the price of contracting for referrals p (as can
be seen in Taxicab, Limousine, and Paratransit Asso-
ciation 1992–1997a, b; see also http://www.tlpa.org/).
The model also predicts that for certain parameter val-
ues, independent owner-operators, fleet-affiliated owner-
operators, and low-skilled shift drivers can coexist—a
situation we describe at length below. Finally, we note
that it is a fairly short step from this theory of pro-
ductivity and vertical integration to a related theory of
capabilities and vertical integration. Although the pro-
ductivity enhancing technology in our model need not
have the defining features of a capability (i.e., an inim-
itable, firm-specific, routine-based source of competitive
advantage), one could replace the generic, exogenously
determined technology in our model with a firm-specific
capability that endogenously improves productivity rel-
ative to other firms. Thus, we could derive a model of
capabilities and vertical integration by adding a firm sub-
script to the parameter . However, this interpretation
raises deeper questions that our model does not address,
notably whether joint production inevitably leads to rela-
tionship specificity in settings where  is rooted in firm-
specific processes and routines, an idea discussed in
more detail by Argyres and Zenger (2012).
3. Empirical Setting:
The Taxicab Industry
Whereas taxicab fleets began using computers during
the 1970s, data dispatch systems did not arrive until the
early 1980s. By the early 1990s, firms began adopting
modern computerized dispatching systems, composed of
a central computer that coordinates vehicles and com-
municates information to vehicle-level onboard com-
puters. Basic computerized dispatching systems, often
called “partially automated” systems, require drivers to
manually send a signal to the central computer, indi-
cating their location by entering a zone number into
a simple onboard computer, and human dispatchers to
announce ride allocations using a separate communi-
cation system (usually a radio). More advanced “fully
automated” systems deploy in-car devices with two-
way communication capability, allowing a back-end
optimization algorithm to communicate directly with
onboard computers in taxicabs. These systems also auto-
matically monitor pickup and drop-off actions, such as
turning the meter on and off. During the sample period,
fixed costs associated with fully automated systems were
approximately $750,000, whereas per-vehicle costs were
approximately $1,000–$2,000, including the onboard
computer (Gilbert et al. 1993). The most advanced com-
puterized dispatching systems are global positioning sys-
tem (GPS) based, which eliminates the need for drivers
to enter zone numbers and track a vehicle’s exact loca-
tion at all times.18
Historically, some taxicab firms were organized
around relatively sophisticated radio-based dispatching
systems, whereas other taxicab firms often had rudimen-
tary dispatching systems, sometimes as basic as hand-
written notes on a bulletin board. Firms with more
advanced dispatching systems usually owned most or
all of their taxicabs and used their dispatching sys-
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who were typically nonowners. At the same time, firms
with simple, low-cost dispatching systems catered to
experienced owner-operators who managed their own
block of business but banded together, often as coopera-
tives or associations, primarily to share maintenance and
administrative costs.
In addition to nonowner drivers and owner-operators
who contract with firms for shared services, there is a
third type of driver: independent owner-operators, typ-
ically very experienced drivers who choose to operate
without any firm affiliation or support. Driving indepen-
dently represents owner-operators’ outside option when
they contract with fleets, as owner-operators are free
to switch between being independent and working for
firms.19
Because the use of the onboard computer compo-
nent of the dispatching system is relatively inexpensive
and is readily contractible in arms-length exchange, it is
unlikely that changes in asset specificity are an impor-
tant driver of changes in firm boundaries in our con-
text. Furthermore, the advent of computerized dispatch-
ing did not produce large changes in incentive intensity
or monitoring. Taxicab drivers are almost always full
residual claimants who pay a fixed fee to the firm and
keep all of the gross revenue from their activities, even
if they do not own the taxicab they drive (Schaller and
Gilbert 1995).
There are two reasons for the ubiquitous use of high-
powered incentives in the taxicab industry: monitoring
costs and legal issues. In most markets, taxicab drivers
both fulfill prearranged rides and search independently
for spot market hails, and firms believe that it is more
efficient to give drivers broad freedoms to drive as they
wish along with strong incentives to locate rides inde-
pendently. Furthermore, compensating drivers with high-
powered incentives allows firms to maintain drivers as
independent contractors, as opposed to formally employ-
ing them, which has significant payroll tax advantages.
Given these two reasons for deploying high-powered
incentives, and the fact that monitoring drivers requires
at least some costly interventions, the system of com-
bining high-powered incentives with limited monitoring
persists to this day, even though more advanced GPS-
based dispatching systems ostensibly allow for greater
levels of monitoring.20 Because high-powered incentive
contracts are nearly ubiquitous and monitoring efforts
circumscribed in the taxicab industry, our empirical
analysis can effectively measure the impact of an IT-
induced productivity change without contamination from
the incentive and monitoring effects that are important
in other settings (e.g., Brynjolfsson 1994, Baker and
Hubbard 2004).
Our theory predicts that more capable drivers should
own their vehicles, and anecdotal evidence from the taxi-
cab industry supports this proposition. Interviews with
fleet managers and taxicab drivers suggest that owner-
operators are more professional, speak better English,
and are able to source more of their own rides than
the low-skilled “shift” drivers who possess only a hack
license and are frequently newly arrived immigrants.
Quantitative evidence is also consistent with our model.
For example, Bruno (2010) reported that driver-owners
earned 37% more than nonowner shift drivers in Chicago
in 2008. Experienced drivers are far more produc-
tive than inexperienced drivers primarily because they
develop a deep understanding of demand patterns in their
markets. Whereas inexperienced drivers tend to ineffi-
ciently chase rides, experienced drivers know where to
go and, importantly, when to wait for rides to materi-
alize without wasting time and gasoline driving around
the city.
Because they are less likely to source their own rides,
low-skilled shift drivers are often the greatest benefi-
ciaries of improved dispatching technology. Relative to
radio dispatching, computerized dispatching levels the
playing field by more efficiently allocating vehicles to
rides (Gilbert et al. 1993). Inexperienced drivers enter
preassigned high-volume zones and wait in an orderly
(virtual) queue until they are assigned a ride, leading to
significantly improved utilization at lower cost. On the
other hand, computerized dispatching is much less valu-
able for experienced drivers because they do not depend
on an efficient dispatching system to operate at close to
full capacity—they already know where to go to find
rides. Thus, the benefits of computerized dispatching are
disproportionately gained by inexperienced drivers.
Another important institutional feature of the taxicab
industry, especially for this study, is the unique local reg-
ulatory, competitive, and geographic factors that influ-
ence the costs and benefits of computerized dispatch-
ing systems. Local regulations determine retail prices,
fix the number of permits or medallions, devise a per-
mit allocation system, limit the transferability of per-
mits, set restrictions on the entry and exit of fleets, and
may require either fleets or individuals to own operating
permits. Moreover, the geography of a city can influ-
ence the distribution of rides between dispatched fares
and curbside hails. Most of these factors are exogenous
to a fleet’s choice of dispatching technology and there-
fore provide the natural experiment missing from many
studies of technology adoption and firm boundaries. Fur-
thermore, we exploit between-market variation in popu-
lation density and taxicab ownership rates to construct
instrumental variables for a fleet’s endogenous decision
to adopt computerized dispatching technology.
Because the full functionality of onboard comput-
ers installed in taxicabs is sometimes specific to the
firm’s dispatching system, transaction cost economics’
asset specificity mechanism represents a leading alter-
native hypothesis to our theory of vertical integration
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Figure 2 Extent of Vertical Integration Before and After















Note. TECH 1997 (dark bar) refers to firms that adopt computer-
ized dispatching technology between 1992 and 1997, whereas No
TECH 1997 (light bar) refers to firms that do not adopt computer-
ized dispatching technology between 1992 and 1997.
technology adoption. The nature of asset specificity is
often context dependent and subtle, which means that
it must be considered carefully.21 However, both data
and interviews suggest that contractual hazards are not
severe with respect to contracting over the installation
and use of onboard computers in the taxicab industry. It
is certainly apparent in the data that many firms deploy
onboard computers in owner-operator vehicles. On aver-
age, 31% of vehicles are owner-operator taxicabs in
firms that use computerized dispatching (see Figure 2).
The fact that the contracting through market exchange to
deploy onboard computers in owner-operator vehicles is
widespread indicates that such contracts are not partic-
ularly fraught with hazards. Industry interviews confirm
that firms often recoup their dispatching investment costs




Data on taxicab ownership come from the 1992 and
1997 Economic Censuses. This comprehensive data set
records every taxicab firm in the United States (Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 412100) with
at least one employee. Economic Census microdata are
extremely valuable because they include the number of
taxicabs by ownership type (e.g., fleet owned versus
driver owned), allowing for an unusually precise mea-
sure of within-firm changes in vertical integration over
time. The Census records 3,184 taxicab firms in 1992
and 3,337 taxicab firms in 1997. Of this population, 787
firms are “substantial entities” that had at least $10,000
of taxicab revenue and two taxicabs and that maintained
operations during in both 1992 and 1997.
Because the Economic Census does not contain infor-
mation on dispatching technology, we use two addi-
tional sources of data on the adoption of computer-
ized dispatching.22 The first source of dispatching data
is a detailed survey conducted in 1998 by the Tran-
sit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP; Gilbert et al.
2002).23 We augment the TCRP data with information
from our own mail survey, conducted in 2005, of all
taxicab operators in the Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) busi-
ness register with taxicab SIC code 412100 and at least
two employees.24 Our survey was addressed to the prin-
cipal owner of the firm on record with D&B and asked
six questions about the firm’s current and past dispatch-
ing systems (type and year of adoption) as well as five
additional questions about the firm’s vertical and hor-
izontal scope, age, and regulatory environment.25 We
merged the resulting 635 observations (363 TCRP obser-
vations and 272 author survey observations) with the
3,153 observations in the 1997 Economic Census by zip
code or county code and firm size. The merging process
generated 409 unique matched observations, 197 from
the TCRP survey and 212 from the authors’ survey.26
Of the 409 matched observations, 244 operated continu-
ously between 1992 and 1997 and reported valid data in
both years to the Economic Census, representing 31%
of all substantial entities.
Table 1 describes our key variables, and Table 2 shows
summary statistics for the firms in the sample used for
our empirical tests (n= 244) and for all firms that meet
our sampling criteria in 1992 or 1997, including firms
that entered or exited the industry between 1992 and
1997. Of the taxicab firms in the test sample, 36%
adopted computerized dispatching between 1992 and
1997. The average firm in our sample had 52 taxicabs in
1992, 89% of which were owned, compared to an aver-
age fleet size of 19 taxicabs with 82% owned in the full
set of substantial entities in the Economic Census. By
1997, the average firm in our sample had grown to 67
taxicabs (65% owned), compared to an average fleet size
of 27 taxicabs (61% owned) for the entire census. Our
test sample contains 63% and 55% of all taxicabs in U.S.
fleets in 1992 and 1997, respectively. Although this sam-
ple contains a significant proportion of the substantial
entities in the industry, larger firms are clearly oversam-
pled. Because we are interested in estimating the effect
of dispatching technology adoption on the set of firms
at risk to adopt, not necessarily the population average
treatment effect of computerized dispatching adoption
for all taxicab firms, it is reasonable to focus on a sample
of larger substantial entities. Although nonresponse bias
remains a threat, a series of robustness checks suggest
that it does not influence our results.
Table 3 shows the size distribution of firms in our
empirical tests in 1992, and the percentage of firms
that adopted computerized dispatching between 1992
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Table 1 Variable Descriptions
Level of
Variable name variation Purpose Description
Dependent and explanatory variables
ã FOWN Firm Dependent variable measuring the extent of
firm vertical integration
Percentage change in the proportion of taxicabs
in the fleet owned by the firm, 1992–1997
Adoption of computerized
dispatching (TECH )
Firm Explanatory variable measuring
productivity-enhancing information
technology adoption
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm adopted
computerized dispatching between 1992 and
1997; 0 otherwise
Control variables
ã log taxicab capital Firm Change in firm size control Change in the logged value of firm taxicab
capital, 1992–1997
ã log taxicab capital 2 Firm Change in firm size control (nonlinear
effects)




Market Change in market-level vertical integration
control
Percentage change in the proportion of fleet
owned taxicabs in other fleets in the same
market, 1992–1997
ã log (taxis in the
market−i )
Market Market growth control in the focal product
(taxicabs)
Change in the log number of taxicabs in other
firms in the same market, 1992–1997
ã log (limousines in the
market−i )
Market Market growth control in substitute products
(limousines)
Change in the log number of limousines in other
firms in the same market, 1992–1997
ã log limousine capital Firm Change in firm scope control Change in the logged value of firm limousine
capital, 1992–1997
ã log limousine capital 2 Firm Change in firm scope control (nonlinear
effects)
Change in the logged value of firm limousine
capital, 1992–1997
ã log county population Market Control for changes in market demand Change in log market population, 1992–1997
Instrumental variables
Avg. taxicabs/fleet in the
market−i (AVGTAXIS)
Market Instrument for TECH The number of taxicabs per fleet (excluding the
focal firm) in the same market in 1992
Log market population
(POP)
Market Instrument for TECH, numerator of
population density
The log of market populations in 1992
Log market size (miles2) Market Instrument for TECH, denominator of
population density
The log of market land area in 1992
As expected, the smallest firms, those with exactly two
taxicabs, never adopted computerized dispatching tech-
nology, whereas 70% of fleets with 50 or more taxicabs
in 1992 adopted computerized dispatching systems by
1997. The rate for the largest size category is approxi-
mately three times the rate for firms with fewer than 25
taxicabs (23% adoption rate), which supports our con-
tention that large firms are more likely to adopt comput-
erized dispatching systems.
Figure 2 illustrates the secular decline in vertical inte-
gration in taxicab firms and previews our main result,
showing changes in vertical integration levels for the
“treated” firms that adopted computerized dispatching
systems during that time period and the “control” that
did not. In 1992, the 87 IT-adopting firms owned 86% of
their vehicles, whereas the 157 firms that did not adopt
computerized dispatching owned 91% of their vehicles.
By 1997, after the secular decline in levels of vertical
integration, the adopters owned 69% of their vehicles
(a drop of 17%), whereas the nonadopters owned 62%
of their vehicles (a decrease of 29%). Thus, net of the
secular decline in vertical integration, firms that adopted
computerized dispatching systems increased their level
of vertical integration by 12% relative to firms that did
not adopt. In the statistical tests that follow, we show that
these summary statistics closely approximate the rela-
tionship between computerized dispatch adoption and
average changes in asset ownership after controlling for
observables and allowing for endogenous technology
adoption.
4.2. Empirical Specification
To measure the impact of computerized dispatching sys-
tems on changes in vertical integration, we ran cross-
sectional regressions in first differences using the change
in the share of vehicles owned by fleet i 4ãFOWN i5,
which is continuous and bounded between −1 and 1,
and a binary explanatory variable ãTECH i that equals 1
if the firm adopts computerized dispatching technology
and 0 otherwise, as in the ordinary least squares (OLS)
equation
ãFOWN i = +ãTECH i+ Xi+ i0 (2)
The cross-sectional first-differences specification in
Equation (2) is similar to using firm and time fixed
effects when there are only two periods of observa-
tion. In particular, the parameter  measures the aver-
age change in fleet ownership rates for nonadopters,
and  measures the difference in fleet ownership
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics
1992 1997
Mean SD Mean SD
Adoption of computerized 0.02 0.17 0.36 0.48
dispatching
Fleet-owned taxicabs (share) 0.89 0.30 0.66 0.39
Total taxicabs 52 112 67 131
Fleet-owned taxicabs 46 110 45 112
Driver-owned taxicabs 6 29 22 72
Taxicab capital ($000) 546 11321 864 11887
Total limousines 0 0 7 17
Limousine capital ($000) 7 52 74 189
Taxicab revenue ($000) 11283 21808 11640 31954
Corporation 0.84 0.38 0.84 0.39
Market fleet-owned 0.63 0.33 0.36 0.23
taxicabs−i (share)
Taxicabs in the market 171 391 328 508
Limousines in the market 44 112 113 242
County population (000) 730 11079 814 11170
County square miles 11018 11455 11038 11594
All firms
Taxicab revenue ($M) 521 669
Number of taxicabs 20,014 29,960
Number of fleet-owned taxicabs 16,426 18,303
Number of fleets 1,020 1,106
Notes. The n = 244 sample includes firms that responded to at least
one of the taxicab technology surveys (TCRP or author), could be
matched to the Economic Census, and meet all of the following
sampling criteria: SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, taxicab rev-
enue of $10,000 or more, and at least two taxicabs in both 1992
and 1997. “All firms” includes firms that meet the sampling crite-
ria in at least one year (1992 or 1997). Note that Census Bureau
restrictions prohibit publication of minimum and maximum variable
values.
it is a difference-in-differences estimator). Estimating
the model in first differences within fleets controls for
time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity without bias-
ing the estimated standard errors downward, allowing us
Table 3 Size Distribution of Firms and Computerized
Dispatching Technology Adoption
Average size by
Number of firm by 1992 Percentage
firms by 1992 size category of firms
1992 fleet size category (taxicabs adopting TECH
size (count) per firm) 1992–1997
2 taxicabs 8 2 0
3–4 taxicabs 32 4 19
5–9 taxicabs 48 8 15
10–24 taxicabs 59 16 25
25–49 taxicabs 40 36 38
≥50 taxicabs 57 164 70
Total 244 52 34
Notes. The sample includes firms that responded to at least one
of the taxicab technology surveys (TCRP or author), could be
matched to the Economic Census, and meet all of the following
sampling criteria: SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, taxicab rev-
enue of $10,000 or more, and at least two taxicabs in both 1992
and 1997. TECH, computerized dispatching.
to conservatively cluster our standard errors at the mar-
ket (county) level.
Following Rawley and Simcoe’s (2010)27 work on
vertical integration in taxicab fleets, we include a set
of exogenous control variables, Xi, that could plausi-
bly shift the boundary of the firm. The controls include
changes in firm size (logged number of vehicles) to cap-
ture scale effects; changes in horizontal scope, measured
by log limousine capital and log limousine capital2;28
changes in the level of vertical integration of other
fleets in the same market, to control for time-varying
market-level drivers of vertical integration; and changes
in the number of taxicabs and limousines under manage-
ment operated by competing fleets in the same market
(county), a proxy for the competitive dynamics of the
firm’s operating environment.
In the ideal experiment, one would randomly assign
computerized dispatching to firms and observe how their
asset ownership patterns changed relative to firms that
were not assigned the technology. However, the decision
to adopt computerized dispatching is an endogenous
choice that may be influenced by unobserved firm-
specific factors that are also correlated with changes
in asset ownership. Even OLS specifications that con-
trol for time-invariant firm characteristics and changes
in firm size may not identify the causal impact of
computerized dispatching on asset ownership because
the benefits of computerized dispatching vary based on
unobservable (to the analyst) firm and market character-
istics that may also be correlated with asset ownership
decisions. We address the potential for endogeneity
in the technology adoption decision using propensity
score matching to control for observable differences
between firms29 and IVs to control for selection on
unobservables.
The main concern with our OLS first-differences spec-
ification is that, even after balancing on the propen-
sity score, fleets may adopt computerized dispatching
because of unobserved factors that raise the returns to
both IT adoption and vertical integration. These omit-
ted variables would lead us to overestimate the causal
impact of computerized dispatch adoption on fleet asset
ownership. We exploit the fact that taxicab fleets in our
sample operate in hundreds of distinct local markets to
construct instrumental variables that are correlated with
the adoption of dispatching technology and (by assump-
tion) uncorrelated with unobserved factors that influence
the level of vertical integration.30
Our first IV is population density, which enters the
first-stage flexibly as logged population (POP) and land
area 4miles25. Greater population density increases the
returns to adopting computerized dispatching technology
because the complexity of taxicab operations tends to
increase in markets where optimally matching vehicles
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terminate. And because population density is clearly pre-
determined, it should be uncorrelated with factors that
shift the returns to fleet asset ownership.
Our second IV is the lagged (1992) average fleet size
of other firms in the same market (AVGTAXIS). Lagged
size of other fleets in the same market should not cause
changes in firm asset ownership, particularly when con-
trolling for the firm’s time-invariant characteristics as
well as the change in the firm’s own size. However,
lagged average size of other fleets in the same market
may be correlated with a firm’s adoption of a comput-
erized dispatching system to the extent that the firm is
operating in a market where supply and demand, or regu-
latory characteristics of the market, tend to exogenously
increase the average size of firms.
An ideal instrumental variable would generate fleet-
level variation in the incentives to adopt computerized
dispatching, thereby allowing us to control for market-
specific trends in asset ownership. Unfortunately, we
could not identify any fleet-level instruments, so our
identification strategy is vulnerable to omitted vari-
ables that are correlated with both our market-level
instruments and firm-level changes in asset ownership.
In particular, one may be concerned that independent
owner-operators are more likely to contract with fleets in
markets where AVGTAXIS is larger. However, we expect
any resulting bias to be small because our specifica-
tion controls for time-invariant firm-specific factors and
a number of time-varying observables at both the firm
and market levels.
5. Results
We test the hypothesis that adopting productivity-
enhancing technology leads to increased vertical
integration and a less skilled workforce by running
within-fleet regressions of changes in asset ownership
on the adoption of computerized dispatching systems.
Table 4 shows the results of tests on the survey respon-
dent set with no controls. Column 1 reports estimates
from a simple OLS specification. We find a strong partial
correlation between IT adoption and increases in ver-
tical integration. Specifically, the share of fleet-owned
vehicles increased by 13% in firms that adopted comput-
erized dispatching systems compared to those that did
not adopt. The large negative coefficient on the constant
term (5 reflects the secular trend toward disintegration
apparent in Figure 2. Column 2 in Table 4 shows results
of the same model after matching and weighting by the
propensity score to control for observable differences
between adopting and nonadopting fleets. Although the
broad shift toward vertical disintegration becomes more
pronounced in this specification, there is no change in
the estimated impact of computerized dispatch adoption
on fleet asset ownership.
Table 4 Adoption of Computerized Dispatching Technology




Adoption of TECH 0013∗∗ 0013∗∗ 0048∗∗
400065 400065 400195
Constant −0029∗∗∗ −0041∗∗∗ −0040∗∗∗
400045 400055 400075
R 2/psuedo-R 2 0003 0002 N/A




t-statistic on AVGTAXIS 401
t-statistic on POP 202
t-statistic on miles2 −100
Adjusted R 2 0008
Notes. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market
(county) level. The sample includes firms that responded to at least
one of the taxicab technology surveys (TCRP or author), could be
matched to the Economic Census, and meet all of the following
sampling criteria: SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, taxicab rev-
enue of $10,000 or more, and at least two taxicabs in both 1992
and 1997.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1% level.
Although OLS and propensity score matched esti-
mates are approximately equal to the raw difference-
in-differences shown in Figure 2, the size of our esti-
mated effect increases substantially when we instrument
for the fleet’s adoption decision (column 3 in Table 4).
The lower part of column 3 shows that the instruments
are strong statistically, with an F -statistic of 8.2 and
statistically significant t-statistics on two of the three
instruments in the first stage of the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) model. The top part of column 3 reports
the second-stage estimates from our 2SLS procedure,
which are more than three times larger than the esti-
mates in columns 1 and 2. Although our 2SLS esti-
mates are much noisier than the OLS and propensity
score-matched parameter estimates, the differences in
coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level.
The interpretation of the 2SLS result is that if comput-
erized dispatching technology adoption were randomly
assigned, the impact of ãTECH on firm asset ownership
would be larger than at firms that do (endogenously)
adopt the technology. Thus, if the 2SLS instruments
are valid, the endogenous adoption of computerized dis-
patching biases the true impact of adoption on asset
ownership toward zero. Comparing the OLS and 2SLS
results suggests that IT adopters in dense cities with
large taxi fleets remained more integrated than a typical
fleet that adopts computerized dispatching. One possible
explanation for this finding is that large dense cities have
a more competitive pool of low-skilled labor to draw
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Because we have more instruments than endogenous
variables, it is possible to conduct a test of overidentify-
ing restrictions using Sargan’s J -statistic. The overiden-
tification test weakly rejects the null hypothesis that all
of our instruments are valid (p < 0010), suggesting that
the three IVs used in our model produce rather differ-
ent point estimates of the treatment effect. To test the
robustness of our results, particularly for the IV spec-
ification, we add a number of firm- and market-level
controls. These results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that several controls do appear to influ-
ence vertical integration. As in Rawley and Simcoe
(2010), we find that increasing diversification into
limousines (ã log limousine capital) leads to decreased
Table 5 Adoption of Computerized Dispatching Technology




Adoption of TECH 0012∗∗ 0013∗∗ 0045∗∗
400065 400065 400225
ã log taxicab capital 0005 0004 0006
400055 400055 400055
ã log taxicab capital 2 −0001∗ −0001 −0002∗
400015 400015 400015
ã Fleet-owned taxicabs 0004 −0004 −0000
market−i (%) 400075 400085 400085
ã log(taxicabs in the market−i 5 0001 0001 0002
400025 400025 400025
ã log(limousines in the market−i 5 0002 0003 0003
400025 400025 400035
ã log limousine capital −0004∗∗ −0004∗∗ −0002
400025 400025 400025
ã log limousine capital 2 −0001∗ −0001∗ −0001∗∗
400005 400005 400005
ã log county population 0002∗∗ 0002∗∗ 0003∗∗∗
400015 400015 400015
Constant −0014∗∗∗ −0015∗∗∗ −0027∗∗∗
400055 0005 400105
R2/psuedo-R2 0020 0020 N/A




t-statistic on AVGTAXIS 305
t-statistic on POP 204
t-statistic on (miles25 market −105
Adjusted R2 0012
Notes. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market
(county) level. The sample includes firms that responded to at least
one of the taxicab technology surveys (TCRP or author), could be
matched to the Economic Census, and meet all of the following
sampling criteria: SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, taxicab rev-
enue of $10,000 or more, and at least two taxicabs in both 1992
and 1997.
∗Significant at the 10% level; ∗∗significant at the 5% level;
∗∗∗significant at the 1% level.
vertical integration because firms replace nonowner taxi-
cab drivers with more professional owner-operators to
manage diseconomies of scope. Also, when firms grow
their taxicab business quickly (which we control for
with (ã log taxicab capital)25, they rely more heavily
on attracting owner-operators, which leads to lower lev-
els of firm ownership of taxicabs. Although the inclu-
sion of controls explains a much larger proportion of the
variance of changes in asset ownership (the R2 jumps
from 0.03 to 0.20 in the OLS specification), the magni-
tude and statistical significance of our main results are
unchanged relative to Table 4.
With controls, the 2SLS estimate of the impact of
computerized dispatching technology on asset ownership
is large and statistically significant, but the difference
between the 2SLS and OLS point estimates ceases to
be statistically significant. Unfortunately, we cannot be
certain whether the lack of statistical significance on the
difference in the coefficients is a result of effectively
controlling for sources of firm-specific heterogeneity in
our OLS specification or if the result is being driven by
noise in the 2SLS estimate. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman
test for the necessity of the instruments, in the presence
of the full set of controls, was equivocal as it did not
reject the hypothesis that the instruments are necessary
only at the 10% level. A more pressing concern is that
an F -statistic of 4.0 in first stage may indicate that the
second-stage results are being spuriously generated by
the many weak instruments problem. To verify that the
2SLS results are not being driven by the many weak
instruments problem, we reestimated the 2SLS models
using only our main instrument—lagged average size of
other firms in the same market—and found the magni-
tude of the 2SLS estimates to be even larger (though
noisier) and still statistically significant at the 5% level.
We use two robustness checks to verify that our results
are not being driven by nonresponse bias. First, because
fleet size is positively correlated with both response rates
and computerized dispatch adoption, we tried treating all
nonrespondents as nonadopters and ran the OLS regres-
sions on the full sample (including a dummy to indi-
cate unmatched firms). We obtained nearly identical esti-
mates to our original OLS specification, suggesting that
the effect of excluding the unmatched firms from our
main analysis does not bias the results. Second, we reran
all of our models (both with and without the nonrespon-
dents) using a sample that excludes small firms, using
different definitions of small (e.g., more than 5 taxicabs,
10 taxicabs, or 20 taxicabs). These models also produce
similar, though progressively nosier, results as with the
larger set. These robustness checks strongly suggest that
our results are not driven by nonresponse bias in the
collection of survey data.
Taken together, the empirical results show that the
adoption of computerized dispatching leads to (at least) a
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finding supports this paper’s core hypothesis that when
workers have private information about their own ability,
and the returns to technology adoption are decreasing
in worker ability, adoption of a productivity-enhancing
technology will be accompanied by increasing firm asset
ownership and a reduction in skilled labor use.
6. Conclusion
This paper develops and tests a simple formal model that
demonstrates how changes in productivity can alter firm
boundaries and employee skills. In particular, if high-
skilled workers realize lower benefits from adopting
a productivity-enhancing information technology (e.g.,
because of capacity constraints), then technology adop-
tion leads to increased vertical integration and deskilling
within the firm. Though simple, the model represents
an important first step toward formalizing the relation-
ship between productivity and firm boundaries that lies
at the heart of the literature on capabilities and verti-
cal integration (Jacobides and Winter 2005). We test the
model’s core prediction using data on the adoption of
computerized dispatching systems in taxicab firms. Taxi-
cab firms that adopt computerized dispatching between
1992 and 1997 increased their share of fleet-owned vehi-
cles by 12% relative to nonadopters over the same time
period. This result is robust to controls for endoge-
nous technology adoption, suggesting that technology-
induced changes in productivity lead to changes in firm
boundaries in a predictable manner, even in the absence
of noncontractible changes in asset specificity.
Though we identify conditions under which informa-
tion technology adoption leads to increased vertical inte-
gration, and we show that our particular empirical con-
text fits well with these conditions, our results may not
generalize well to other settings. In particular, a key
necessary condition for the results in our formal model
is that the marginal benefits of information technology
adoption are diminishing with worker ability. Building
on Levinthal and Wu (2010), we motivated this assump-
tion in terms of capacity-constrained resources; its valid-
ity in other contexts will depend on the particulars of the
institutional setting. A second limitation of our study is
that we have little to say about the origins of heteroge-
neous worker ability. We treat each worker’s skill as an
exogenous endowment, akin to natural ability. Expand-
ing on the model to endogenize worker ability, perhaps
as knowledge gained as the outcome of a learning pro-
cess, would be an interesting extension of our model,
but that is beyond the scope of this study.
This paper exploits a unique empirical setting to make
credible causal inferences about the impact of tech-
nology adoption on vertical integration. However, the
idiosyncrasies of the taxicab industry should not cloud
the general applicability of our conceptual approach
to a broad range of firms and industries. Indeed, at
least since Demsetz (1988), scholars have long sus-
pected that heterogeneity in productive capabilities can
explain vertical integration in any industry. What our
model highlights that has been missing from informal
characterizations of heterogeneous productivity and firm
boundaries is the crucial role non-skill-biased technical
change can play in driving vertical integration decisions.
In particular, our analysis demonstrates the importance
of understanding the interplay between technological
change and worker skills when studying firm boundary
decisions. To see the generality of this idea, consider
Rochlin’s (1997) account of the rise of the vertically
integrated firm at the end of the second industrial rev-
olution, which describes how a great wave of tech-
nological improvement squeezed out autonomous craft
suppliers working with their own tools in favor of a
lower-skilled employee workforce that produced out-
puts using firm-owned assets. More recently, in the
context of analyzing the Zara Corporation, Gallaugher
(2008) noted the connection between improved infor-
mation technologies, lower-skilled labor, and vertically
integrated manufacturing.32 Although we do not claim
that our model is universal, the qualitative results of
Rochlin (1997) and Gallaugher (2008) hint at its broad
applicability to settings outside the taxicab industry.
This article also closes a gap between intuition and
theory in the existing literature by providing a simple
testable framework for evaluating the impact of produc-
tivity enhancements on vertical integration. In terms of
the workhorse model of vertical integration, transaction
cost economics, a key insight from our model is that
by allowing the firm’s production technology to vary
exogenously, while holding asset specificity constant
(instead of making the traditional assumption that the
firm’s productive capacity remains fixed while allowing
asset specificity to vary exogenously), one can generate
clear predictions about the link between productivity and
vertical integration. Our key empirical finding provides
large-sample evidence of a causal relationship between
productivity-enhancing information technology adoption
and the boundary of the firm. By delivering a well-
identified empirical result, this research lends credence
to prior work on productivity and vertical integration
(Jacobides and Hitt 2005). Methodologically, this study
points to the opportunities inherent in exploiting exoge-
nous local market variation in localized industries to
identify the causal effects of organizational strategies.
Empirical research in strategy is increasingly concerned
with identification (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003), and
localized industries offer tremendous potential for gen-
erating empirical tests that control for the endogeneity
of organizational choices.
For practitioners, this research suggests an opportunity
for forward-looking managers to anticipate the impact of
information technology adoption decisions on the orga-
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the boundary of the firm is one of the cornerstones of
corporate strategy. We show how corporate managers
can anticipate the implications of productivity-enhancing
information technology on the vertical scope of the firm.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. In any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, p +
b < x and x= .
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose x < p + b, so there is no
contracting between skilled asset owners and the fleet. Skilled
workers will prefer rental to owning as long as  − b <  +
41 − 5− x, which implies that the firm’s supply of assets
is ∗ = 4+ b− x5/. Now consider the firm’s second-period
choice of p. Skilled asset owners will contract with the fleet if
and only if  < + 41 − 5−p, so the firm’s demand curve
is D4p5 = 1 − ∗ − p/. Substituting ∗ and solving for the
optimal p reveals that p∗ = 4x− b5/2, which contradicts our
assumption that x < p+ b0
Solving for Equilibrium Prices and Quantities. When
U > L, the firm’s objective is ç4p1b5 = 6U − L7p +
L6 − b7. Substituting U = 4 − p5/ and L = 4b + p +
w − 5/41 − 5 into ç4p1b5 and taking derivatives with
respect to p and b yields the necessary first-order conditions
(FOCs, which are also sufficient conditions, because ç4p1b5
is quadratic in both p and b5:
FOC4b52 24− b−p5−w = 01
FOC4p52 1 + 42− 2b−w5/41 −5− 2p/41 −5= 00
Plugging FOC(b5 into FOC(p5 and solving for p yields p∗ =
/2, and plugging that solution back into FOC(b5 yields b∗ =
4 − w5/2. Finally, replacing p∗ and b∗ in the expressions
for U and L yields U = 1/2 and L = w/241 − 5. Thus,
U > L if and only if w < 41 −5. When w > 41 −5, there
is no contracting, so ç4p1b5= 4b+w56− b7, and the firm’s
optimal offer price is b∗ = 4+w5/2.
Endnotes
1Gilbert et al. (1993) reported that dispatch times fell by
50%–60% following the adoption of computerized dispatch-
ing, and our own estimates suggest that vehicle utilization
increased by 15%–20%.
2Woollett et al. (2009) showed that experienced taxicab drivers
in London develop a remarkably deep understanding of the
spatial structure of the city.
3And, indeed, the productivity gap between the most produc-
tive and least productive drivers is quite significant. For exam-
ple, Schaller and Gilbert (1995) reported that the top quartile
of New York City taxicab drivers earns 59% more than the
bottom quartile earns.
4Jacobides and Winter (2005) argued that capabilities, idiosyn-
cratic factors that lead to productivity differences, are the root
drivers of vertical integration. One might think of IT and
worker skill as capabilities in our model. An alternative gener-
alization of our theory is that we allow technological improve-
ments to substitute for quality-adjusted labor inputs in the
firm’s production function.
5See Macher and Richman (2008) and Lafontaine and Slade
(2007) for reviews of the empirical literature on transaction
cost economics and property rights theory, respectively.
6The labor economics literature on deskilling also suggests
that when information technology substitutes for worker skill,
IT adoption leads to a lower-skilled, or deskilled, workforce
(Autor and Dorn 2012).
7Levinthal and Wu (2010) distinguished between scale-free
resources (e.g., intellectual property) that can be applied with-
out any reduction in utility and non-scale-free resources (e.g.,
worker–vehicle pairs) that exhibit diminishing returns because
of natural physical limits.
8Given our empirical application, we call agents that supply
labor “workers,” although it should be clear that the ideas
apply equally if we call them suppliers, contractors, or firms
and frame the results in terms of outsourcing rather than the
employment relationship. To simplify the exposition, we here-
after refer to firms that supply productivity-enhancing infor-
mation technology simply as “firms.”
9All of our main results would hold in a model with an arbi-
trary number of discrete assets.
10If one takes the view that technology is just a special kind
of asset, and that labor should be measured in terms of human
capital (i.e., adjusted for quality), then there is a capital-for-
labor substitution effect. We discuss this effect in terms of
the impact of technology on changes in skills, rather than
capital–labor substitution, though both perspectives are poten-
tially instructive.
11Although the uniform case is easy to analyze, our results
generalize to other distributions.
12An alternative interpretation of our production technology
is that 41 − 5 is a measure of coordination costs, as in
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employee who can work autonomously with probability  gen-
erates total surplus of + 41−541− 41−55= + 41−5.
More generally, our main results will hold for any technology
where the returns to joint production are diminishing in each
agent’s stand-alone productivity.
13Our model makes no assumptions about the firm’s location
in the value chain. In the taxicab industry, fleets provide dis-
patching service to drivers who service final demand, so a shift
to less skilled nonowner drivers corresponds to “forward” inte-
gration. However, the model also applies to a setting where
the firm acts as an upstream sales agent who could either refer
jobs to independent contractors or “backward integrate” by
assigning the same work to in-house employees.
14By a similar argument, skilled workers who do not own an
asset will rent one from the firm if and only if + 41 −5−
x >w.
15This is where the private information assumption bites.
If the firm can use “metering” to charge workers in propor-
tion to their use of the technology, it will set a limit price
of p45 = 41 − 5 and will be indifferent between extract-
ing its technology-generated rents through contracting or asset
ownership.
16Lemma 1 implies that the firm will be indifferent between
two ways of organizing its supply chain: it could charge
unskilled workers x =  and allow them to service final
demand, or it could hire unskilled workers at w = 0 and sell
the output of  itself. Although the former arrangement (asset
rental) is typical in the taxicab industry, readers may find it
more intuitive to think of a value chain where the firm as
located “between” workers and final demand. In that case,
high-skilled workers might be said to disintermediate the firm.
17The main predictions will go through as long as the demand
for contracting D4p1b5 declines with p and the supply of
assets S4b5 increases with b. For example, these assumptions
will hold in an oligopoly model where firms with identical pro-
ductivity are horizontally differentiated (e.g., geographically).
18Estimates of the cost of partially automated systems vary
widely based on the functionality of the system. The most
basic systems probably cost about half as much as a fully
automated system. GPS-based systems are substantially more
expensive than partially and fully automated systems.
19The U.S. taxicab industry was buffeted by two major shocks
during the mid-1990s. The first, the subject of this paper,
was technological, as new computerized dispatching systems
reached the taxicab market. The second shock, a regulatory
change, led to widespread diversification into limousines and
decreased vertical integration as formerly independent driver-
owners increasingly contracted with firms (Rawley and Simcoe
2010). The net effect of the two shocks was a secular decline
in vertical integration levels between 1992 and 1997. In this
paper, we investigate the effects of computerized dispatching
on asset ownership, controlling for the effect of diversification.
20Our interviews with firms and drivers confirmed that taxicab
drivers were almost always full residual claimants during our
sample period. This practice persists to this day. For exam-
ple, see Bruno (2010) for a detailed analysis of contracting
behavior in the Chicago market.
21See, for example, the role of reputational capital as a
firm-specific asset in the trucking industry (Nickerson and
Silverman 2003).
22We also conducted a number of interviews with city taxi-
cab regulators, fleet owners, dispatching technology vendors,
and taxicab drivers, which provided a wealth of insights that
greatly improved this paper.
23The TCRP survey was conducted during 1997.
24The author survey generated a 26% response rate. We thank
Peter Thompson for providing us with a file that allowed us
to match zip codes from D&B to county codes used in the
Economic Census.
25Both the TCRP and author surveys inquire whether firms use
radio dispatch, GPS-based systems, “fully automated comput-
erized systems,” or “partially computerized” systems. For the
purposes of this study, we treat the three types of computerized
dispatching systems identically (less than 5% of respondents
used GPS during the sample period). The TCRP survey asked
about concurrent use of computerized dispatch, whereas the
author’s survey inquired about current and past use of com-
puterized dispatching systems.
26The 226 unmatched observations were primarily small firms.
Small firms are more difficult to match by zip code or
county code because there are often many small firms in the
same area.
27Rawley and Simcoe (2010) presented two specifications in
their paper on changes in vertical integration in taxicab firms.
We follow the empirical model used in their fixed effects
model with one additional control—change in log taxicab
capital2—although we do so using a cross-sectional regres-
sion in first differences. The first-differences model ãYi = +
ãXi+ i closely approximates the fixed effect model Yit =
a+i +Tt + Xit+ eit . The results are robust to specification
and to excluding the change in log taxicab capital2.
28Rawley and Simcoe (2010) showed that diversification influ-
ences vertical integration in taxicab fleets because of disec-
onomies of scope between limousine and taxicab operations.
They focused on diversification as a binary event (i.e., whether
firms diversify or not). We include continuous measures of
diversification, though our results are robust to controlling for
diversification with a dummy variable.
29As in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we calculate the pro-
pensity score of the probability of adopting computerized
dispatching systems and then drop firms off the common
support of the propensity score distribution. We also weight
included firms by the inverse probability of being treated
(Imbens 2004). Complete first-stage results are available from
the authors upon request. As expected, the most important sin-
gle factor influencing adoption was the (log) number of taxi-
cabs in the firm in 1992.
30Because the 244 fleets in our panel operate in 173 different
local markets, we are not concerned that the instrument will
fail to generate sufficient variation in the first stage.
31All of the results are qualitatively the same in a Tobit
specification.
32Zara uses information technology to dramatically reduce
design to delivery cycle time, but to implement its informa-
tion technology system, the firm eschews high-end outside
designers and textile producers in favor of vertically inte-
grated production designed by employees “fresh from design
school” (Gallaugher 2008, p. 4).
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